Introduction
According to Thomas Pogge, citizens of rich countries are responsible for the extreme poverty that currently exists in the world. The reason is that their governments act to keep a global set of institutions in force which causes much of this poverty. Rich countries, Pogge holds, have the power to change the ruling arrangements in such ways that extreme poverty can be eradicated. A mere 1 percent of Global GNP (321 billion dollar) would suffice for bringing the 2.8 billion of people now eking out an existence below the poverty line of 2 dollar PPP (purchasing power parity) a day up to this threshold, by means of targeted and effective development programs. Pogge has long argued that a substantial reduction of global poverty is feasible through the creation of an international regime of taxation and redistribution, with actual consumption of oil and other natural resources figuring as the tax base. The tax liabilities so generated would largely fall on the rich countries, and would induce flows of transfers to poor countries sufficient to eradicate most severe poverty (on the 2 dollar PPP norm mentioned above), provided that tax revenues are administered under a worldwide development plan. This plan, the Global Resources Dividend, could constitute the core of a viable alternative set of global institutions, around which one would need to change the existing rules of trade, debt service, and international access to credit. Moreover, world trade could be liberalized in a far less selective way than is currently the case under the regime of the World Trade Organization.
1 Pogge finally proposes far-reaching international agreements that would limit the opportunities of dictatorially governed developing countries to trade natural resources and to borrow on the international market. Such legal arrangements would indirectly contribute to the removal of local causes of poverty and underdevelopment (Pogge, 2002b: 112-16, 141-3, 146-67) .
Given these alternatives, Pogge claims that the rich countries are implicated in the persistence of extreme poverty in various ways. This results in millions of avoidable deaths each year. Those deaths are attributable to the inadequate institutional arrangements which have in part been created by the rich countries, and which could be changed to the benefit of the global poor at only small sacrifices in the living standards of their own citizens. According to Pogge, this means that the rich countries are involved in serious violations of the basic human right of access to sufficient means of subsistence.
2 They are therefore under a clear and compelling negative duty of justice to stop imposing the current global order on the world population, especially on the poor who are terminally harmed by this imposition. The rich countries are bound by the negative duty to initiate the institutional reforms that remove the injustice in as short a time as possible. In this chapter, I critically examine this main thesis of World Poverty and Human Rights. Even though Pogge's institutional perspective on socioeconomic human rights is convincing and fruitful, I will argue that this perspective leads to the proposition that rich countries have a positive duty of justice to fight poverty instead of a negative one. In itself, the failure to fulfil this duty by means of the requisite institutional reforms is a major indiction, which amounts to a charge of criminal negligence. By contrast, if one agrees with Pogge that the implementation of such reforms flows from a negative duty of the rich countries, then the failure to fulfil that duty amounts to a charge of outright killing. This is because violation of a negative duty -in this case the duty to desist from imposition of institutional arrangements which foreseeably lead to massive starvation -implies that the holders of the duty are directly and actively involved in actions that cause undue and terminal harms, through the denial of a universal basic human right. I want to argue that this last and more serious charge is unsustainable. I also think that it is not a productive way of inducing actors with decisive influence on the world's institutional order to face their moral responsibilities. In the next two sections, I discuss the institutional perspective on basic human rights and the distinction between negative and positive duties which underlie Pogge's argument of negative duty. My critique follows in sections 4 to 6. I conclude with some brief remarks on the relevance of the duty controversy.
The institutional perspective on global justice
In a lecture delivered in Oslo in 2003, Pogge explains that his approach to global justice is based upon the theoretical innovation introduced by John Rawls's A Theory of Justice: the shift of the subject of distributive justice from human interactions to the institutional setting in which humans interact under various constitutive roles and positions that arise from constitutional arrangements, legal rules, and government policies. Rawls focuses on principles of distribution (his principles of Justice as Fairness) which assess the justice of the basic structure of institutions of a domestic society, and serve as
